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Intellectual Migration
and Cultural Transformation

Refugees from National
Socialism in the
English-Speaking World

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EDWARD TIMMS AND JON HUGHES

INTRODUCTION

The experiences of refugees from Nazi-occupied Europe have been mapped in a number of recent publications. Studies of official British and American policy during the 1930s have shown that severe obstacles were placed in the way of would-be immigrants (Wyman 1968; London 2000). In response to the pressures of what has been called ‘an age of genocide’, official attitudes towards refugees in the English-speaking world were decidedly unwelcoming, and during debates in the British Parliament in the inter-war period some speakers gave vent to a ‘vicious anti-alienism’ (Kushner and Knox 1999, 73-4). But in practice, despite this ‘climate of restriction’, the barriers against immigration proved rather porous, so that between 1933 and 1945 an estimated 90,000 refugees found at least temporary sanctuary in Britain and probably as many as 250,000 in the United States (London 2000, 5 & 11-12). The migrants, mainly German-speaking and of Jewish origin, tended to come from educated middle-class backgrounds, although they frequently had to contend with a severe loss of status after their arrival. However, in many cases their intellectual gifts enabled them to overcome the barriers of linguistic and ethnic difference so successfully that they made outstanding contributions to their countries of resettlement, in fields ranging from natural science (Medawar and Pyke 2000) to artistic creativity (Snowman 2002). A rich autobiographical literature, supplemented by unpublished interviews and memoirs, offers insights into the underlying personal experiences which sustained the refugees’ professional lives.

Building on a wealth of documentation and research, the present book investigates the less tangible processes of ‘intellectual migration’ and ‘cultural transformation’, drawing on examples ranging from analytical philosophy to child psychology, industrial design to filmmaking. Through a series of case studies, we aim to elucidate questions of underlying principle, as defined by the sociologist Jennifer Platt in Chapter 1. What exactly do we mean by the word ‘intellectual’? How did the migrants come to terms with the twin obstacles of antisemitism and anti-intellectualism? Is it plausible to argue that certain forms of cultural transformation would have taken place in the English-speaking world even without the arrival of the émigrés? Is it right to assume that British culture in the 1930s was ‘backward’
CHRISTIAN FLECK

THE ROLE OF REFUGEE HELP ORGANIZATIONS IN THE PLACEMENT OF GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN SCHOLARS ABROAD

Mutual aid and involvement in politics are by no means essentials of the academic community. Yet in the following paper I will tell the story of an unselfish endeavour designed to help scholars and conducted by people like them; even more surprisingly, the beneficiaries came from foreign countries and could be seen by colleagues as competitors threatening to push them aside. I shall focus on two refugee help organizations: the Academic Assistance Council, later renamed the Society for the Protection of Science and Learning, based in London and later relocated to Cambridge, and still active; and the Emergency Committee in Aid of Displaced German (later: Foreign) Scholars in New York, which ceased to operate at the end of the Second World War. My paper is based on an archival study of the files of the Committee and additional lesser-known printed material from both agencies. The files of both organizations are accessible to researchers, but have seldom been used to assess the organizations themselves. I will focus on three areas: first the invention of this particular kind of refugee help and the differences between the two agencies, second the relationship between the two, and finally some remarks on the decision-making process.

Casual Conversations

It could have happened at any time of the day because meeting someone at a place like this one was not restricted to a particular slot in the daily schedule. According to one participant’s memoir it was evening. Unfortunately he does not give details about the location but he indicates at least that it was in one of Vienna’s coffeehouses. In the first third of the twentieth century the coffeehouse served Vienna’s middle class as an enlarged living room where you could have an appointment with anyone, including your own wife, but where you could also just spend your time browsing through newspapers, talking casually to an occasional visitor or informally to a business associate, or seriously to a friend, or where you could play chess for money (as the economic historian Alexander Gerschenkron did) or just sit and write.

Sir William Beveridge, the long-time director of the London School of Economics and Political Science, was in his early fifties; a highly
influential political advisor and commentator he was not, however, equally regarded as an outstanding scholar among economis. He had come to Vienna for a meeting about an international research project on the history of prices and wages under his direction, which he had persuaded the Social Science Division of the Rockefeller Foundation to fund (Beveridge 1939). At the same time the rising star among the economist at LSE, Lionel Robbins, was visiting Vienna too, accompanied by his wife, to see fellow economists from the so-called Austrian School. One evening the three Britons had planned to come together with a Viennese from Beveridge’s generation, who thought himself the leading representative of serious economics in Central Europe and who was seen by others as the true successor of the famous first generation of Viennese economists. He was prevented from accepting one of their university chairs primarily because of his non-Aryan origin, but also because of ordinary rivalry between academicians. His name was then Ludwig Mises. Beveridge and Mises embraced opposite approaches to social policy: Beveridge’s name is forever connected with the construction of Britain’s postwar welfare state and the then exiled Mises wrote piece after piece condemning bitterly all interventional proposals in economics. Robbins was much closer to Mises’s point of view, indeed he saw himself as a disciple of the Austrian School in questions of economic theory but not necessarily in politics.

The two seniors, Beveridge and Mises, shared one personal characteristic; both were still bachelors in their middle age, something which is worth mentioning here because it explains why this conversation took place in the public sphere of a coffeehouse and not during a dinner at Mises’s house. The exact date of the meeting is unknown. Hitler had been Germany’s chancellor since 30 January and in March 1933 the Nazi party finished first in elections which were held in the wake of the terrifying events surrounding the burning of the Reichstag. (Despite the terror the Nazis did not gain the majority of votes). The creation of the first concentration camp for political dissidents near Munich was publicly announced on March 21, but the persecution of people who did not rank first as political opponents of the Nazis was only in the offing. People who were not outspoken opponents of the Nazi movement judged the political situation ambiguously. The regulation that eventually ousted a large group of German professors was announced on April 7, 1933 and came into operation when the summer term started at Germany’s universities.

The Role of Refugee Help Organizations

The participants also disagree about who first made the suggestion of a formal society to aid German scholars. Robbins writes that the three British were sitting in the lobby of the Hotel Bristol ‘exchanging impressions of travel’ (Robbins 1971, 143), awaiting Mises to go out for dinner. Mises arrived with a newspaper in hand pointing to an article about the dismissal of German professors. Beveridge on the other hand not only suggests that all four were sitting in a coffeehouse but provides a highly detailed description of what happened then. Someone, he writes, brought an evening paper ‘with an announcement that a dozen leading professors of all faculties were been dismissed from posts in German Universities’ (Beveridge 1955, 234). According to Beveridge he and Robbins decided at this very moment to do something for ‘teachers and scientists in our subjects.’ Robbins, however, praises Mises as the originator of the idea and applauds Beveridge only for agreeing to it: ‘This was one of Beveridge’s great moments – his finest hour I would say.’ But according to Robbins, Mises made the proposal. He asked the British ‘was it not possible to make some provision in Britain for the relief of such victims, of which the names mentioned [in the newspaper] were only the beginning of what was obviously to be an extensive persecution’ (Robbins 1971, 144). It might be that Sir William jumped on the Mises bandwagon. This interpretation would add to the understanding of both the persons and particularly the wider topic of the relationship between creating ideas and putting them in practice. It would not have been the first time in recent history that an Austrian invented something but others made it run. The casual environment of a coffeehouse promotes creating ideas but does not encourage their implementation. Another man from Central Europe claimed for himself the credit for being the inventor of the idea to establish an organization helping ousted German professors. As early as 1933 Leo Szilard wrote a two and a half page long letter to an American fellow physicist about his immediate reactions after the chancellorship was handed over to Hitler (Szilard, no date). A native Hungarian, Szilard had lived during the 1920s in Berlin, where he held a Privatdozentur, that characteristic German professorship in waiting. He left Germany for Vienna a few days after the Reichstag fire.

While I was in Vienna [...] I met, by pure chance, walking in the street a colleague of mine, Dr. Jacob Marschak, who was an economist at Heidelberg. [...] He was rather sensitive; not being a German, but coming from Russia he had seen revolutions and
upheavals, and went to Vienna where he had relatives. [...] I told him that I thought since we were out here we might well make up our minds what needed to be done. [...] He said that he knew a rather wealthy economist in Vienna who might have some advice to give. His name was Schlesinger and he had a very beautiful apartment in the Liechtensteinpalais. (Szilard 1989, 97)

Karl Schlesinger, a much-admired economist with no formal ties to the University of Vienna but substantial ones to the circle around Mises, earned a living in business and banking. A few years after Szilard’s approach he committed suicide when Hitler’s troops invaded Austria. In spring 1933 Schlesinger brought the two exiled scholars together with Ignaz Jastrow, a German professor who attended the meeting that Beveridge had convened. Jastrow suggested contacting Beveridge. Realizing that he was staying at the same Hotel Regina, just across from the main building of the university, Szilard introduced himself to the gentleman in the course of breakfast. According to Szilard’s memoir Beveridge agreed to meet Schlesinger and Marschak to talk about the idea how to help dismissed German professors. Szilard reports in the undated letter from London to his friend in New York what happened during one of his conversations with Beveridge. Both ‘talking over the matter [...] and we made up our minds to try to create, if possible, some institution of more or less permanent value for the advancement of science and scholarship.’

British Generosity

After returning to London, Beveridge first asked the LSE faculty to establish through self-taxation an Academic Freedom Fund for the aid of the dismissed German professors in the fields of study covered by their own institution, that is social sciences. According to the German historian Hirschfeld the professorial council accepted Beveridge’s suggestion to donate between one and three per cent of their annual income, depending on the status of the donor (Hirschfeld 1988, 30). Hirschfeld estimates the annual total of this self-taxation to £1,000. At this time Beveridge himself received about £2,500 as director of the LSE, whereas the General Secretary of the Academic Assistance Council, Walter Adams, got about £500 annually as salary (Beveridge 1959, 6). A few days later Beveridge became the leading force in establishing a nation-wide counterpart. The aim of the Academic Assistance Council was – as he put it in his autobiography - to support ‘teachers and investigators of whatever country who, on grounds of

religion, political opinion or race, are unable to carry on their work in their own country’ (Beveridge 1955, 236-7). Beveridge assembled a group of high-ranking academicians and persuaded Lord Rutherford of Nelson, Cavendish Professor of Physics at Cambridge University and winner of the 1908 Nobel Prize, to take over the presidency of the newly established organization. ‘On May 24, 1933 the birth of the A.A.C. was announced,’ as Beveridge put it in his history of this endeavour (Beveridge 1959, 3). Forty-three outstanding British scholars signed the document, among them another Nobel laureate, the physiologist Sir Archibald V. Hill, who received the Prize in 1922, who became one of the vice-chairmen of the Executive Committee. He was joined in this position by the director of the British Museum and Secretary of the British Academy, Sir Frederic Kenyon. Other signatures came from John Maynard Keynes, Gilbert Murray, George Trevelyan, all in all in the crème-de-la-créme of British scholarship. However, representatives of the Royal Society urged the initiators to avoid the participation of Jews so as not to provoke prejudice. The A.A.C. should not be perceived as an un-British activity. As a result the A.A.C. got immediate support from the Royal Society, which provided space at its headquarters.

The appeal asked for support in the form of donations, active participation, or by encouraging institutions to offer dismissed Germans asylum. Within a short period of time the A.A.C. received about £13,000, primarily from individuals but also from the Central British Fund for German Jews (A.A.C., Annual Report May 1934, 3-4). About fifty refugee scholars were awarded maintenance grants, half as high as the annual salary of the General Secretary. The success of the fundraisers indicates that the average income of British academics was relatively high at the time and the Great Depression might not have had a strong impact on this part of Great Britain’s population. This view is supported further from a contemporary listing of money raised in different countries for the assistance of dismissed German scholars. According to this list, the A.A.C. funds represented nearly half of all donations made in Great Britain, and Great Britain contributed nearly 40 per cent of the overall sums.

In Austria nothing was done after Mises’s original suggestion, whereas the British academic establishment behaved surprisingly altruistically and were helpful to their German colleagues with whom they had exchanged fierce nationalist pamphlets only two decades earlier. They not only raised money but also offered advice on how to continue academic work abroad. Organizational networks were easily
adapted to new tasks. The structure of authority and decision-making provided the director of an institution like the LSE with latitude to implement successful new policies within a very short time. And old institutions like the Royal Society did not hesitate to become involved in politics. Beveridge, the man who became known as the 'father of the British welfare state' strongly believed in 'voluntary action' throughout his life. Later in his career he studied this particular pattern of mutual help and emphasized how much private initiatives contribute to the institutional diversity of society. This thesis looks like an antithesis to the welfare state approach, which according to its harshest critics mutates into a centralized system, strangling individual responsibility and initiative. Beveridge saw it from a different angle when he argued for a balance between centrally provided and privately raised support (Beveridge 1948; Beveridge and Wells 1949; Harris 1977).

To create something new it is not sufficient simply to present an idea or to be able to raise money. At least three additional features are needed: people willing to commit themselves at least partly to the common effort; institutions willing to help establish a new generation of scholars; and, in the case of activities on an international scale, the utilization of appropriate networks. The British initiative was confined to and took place only within the republic of scholars, thereby circumventing any public resentment. Austrian and Czechoslovakian university people, by contrast, seemed not to feel any responsibility for their German colleagues, but for differing reasons. The majority of Austria's professors sympathized with Hitler's goals, whereas the Czechoslovakian academic world was bitterly divided between a German-speaking minority of mostly anti-Nazi professors and the Czech and Slovak majority whose strong anti-German sentiments restricted their support.

The practical aim of the A.A.C. was to help professional peers in need. To that end they gave not only grants but also loans to cover allowances, salaries, book purchases and, perhaps surprisingly, vacations too. The New York based Emergency Committee acted completely differently, as we will see later. It provided large-scale grants to institutions covering at least half of the supposed costs of living of a professor for one year. Only late in its history, when the A.A.C. changed its name to Society for the Protection of Science and Learning, did it have to ask the British government for support. But thanks to the range of its activities over the years it was much easier to persuade civil servants to award the Society a portion of the taxpayers' money set aside to help refugees from the continent.

America's Institution Men

On the other side of the Atlantic scholars, educators, and philanthropists started their own schemes to support German scholars independently. Three different efforts were made, the first being initiated by the Rockefeller Foundation. During the 1920s and early 1930s about half a dozen officers from the Foundation visited European research centres regularly and met scholars there. A reasonable share (approximately ten per cent) of the annual expenditure of the foundation went to Europe. Given these strong ties it is not surprising that the Nazi assaults on the universities outraged these people personally. Sentiments are one thing; to involve a foundation in a programme of refugee help is quite another. But that's what the men around Max Mason, then the president of the Foundation, did. During the twelve-year period of the Nazi dictatorship the R.F. used the equivalent of nearly thirteen million dollars today to subsidize some three hundred refugee scholars from different European countries and different fields of research.

The second initiative was the work of one man, Alvin S. Johnson, then director of the New School for Social Research and associate editor of the Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, whose first volume appeared in January 1933, at the very same time when the surrender of power to Hitler took place in Germany. Approximately one out of ten contributors to the Encyclopedia was German-speaking, a much higher share than in comparable endeavours before or afterwards. Nevertheless, it would be misleading to suggest that Johnson was a Germanophile; like many others in the course of this story he was an internationalist in politics and a cosmopolitan in scholarly affairs. Johnson's idea of rescue was to bring over a group of dismissed professors, who would find refuge in a single place to continue their research. It sounds a little strange that an American professor was of the opinion that the German style of research necessitated collaboration between scholars of equal rank. Nevertheless, Johnson, with the help of a few colleagues and some friends from the business world, was able to raise the money and persuade a dozen of Germany's dismissed social scientists to cross the Atlantic.

The nucleus of the third rescue project, which I shall discuss in greater detail, was the Institute of International Education. It had been founded in 1919 by Nicholas Murray Butler, President of Columbia University, with the support of Elihu Root, Secretary of State under Theodore Roosevelt, and Stephen P. Duggan, the last of whom
became its first director. The institute aimed to strengthen international goodwill between nations by developing exchange programs for students and professors. It represented America's educational institutions to the rest of the world and functioned as an entrance hall for visiting scholars and students from abroad. It organized lecture tours for German professors, and some of them later came back as refugees. The wide-ranging activities of the institute were secured by financial support from two leading foundations: the Carnegie Corporation and the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial.

Stephen Duggan had been professor of political science at City College since 1896, and his wide-ranging activities included being a trustee of the American College for Girls at Istanbul, and work for the New York Academy for Public Education, whose president he was early in the 1920s. After his early retirement from City College at the age of 57 he devoted himself full time to the new Institute. During the early 1920s it helped Russian emigrants, victims of the Bolshevik revolution, to find new places abroad where they could continue their scholarly work. Furthermore, the Institute and its affiliates were part of the broader movement of re-establishing communication and exchange between the nations which had fought each other during the First World War. Even though the United States had not joined the newly created League of Nations, some American professors were actively involved in the League’s activities, in its International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation, for example, some of whose prominent members were later to be forced into exile; Albert Einstein met Robert Millikan and Gilbert Murray there.

The establishment as early as June 1933 of what, eventually, was named the ‘Emergency Committee in Aid of Displaced German Scholars’ became possible only because of pre-established networks and personal experiences abroad. Almost all individuals and organizations involved in the academic refugee help of the 1930s claimed they were acting for more or less abstract ideas like the freedom of learning and scholarship, thus defending the universal principles underlying the work of scholars all over the world. But looking at the whole group of helpers one comes to the conclusion that many came forward to help their endangered colleagues because they knew them personally. They aided people not principles. Abstract ethical principles work better for justifying behavior than explaining it.

Edward R. Murrow, the young assistant director, had been on the staff of the Institute for only two years when he was invited by his paternalistic superior to take over the same job in the new Emergency Committee. From then on he worked both for the Institute and the Committee until 1935, when he accepted an offer from CBS, where he started his much better-known career. As a director of radio talks he later came to London to report during the Second World War, subsequently playing a significant role in the world of television. As the former president of the National Student Federation, Murrow had had some experience overseas when he had attended meetings of the International Student Service in Geneva, and he swiftly gained a reputation as a skilful administrator and negotiator.

The initiative to do something for the dismissed German professors, however, came from another quarter. Alfred E. Cohn seems to have been the first to approach Duggan, sending him a list of dismissed professors and asking that in his view something should be done. Cohn, an expert in electrocardiography at the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research, was nine years younger than Duggan. Archival material suggests that Cohn had persuaded philanthropists like Felix Warburg to place some funds at the disposal of the new Committee before he approached Duggan, whom he knew only fleetingly. On the invitation of Duggan a group of seven assembled at the Century Club in midtown Manhattan on June 15, 1933 to find a proper name, establish an agenda, and define the scope and method of the committee-information. It was not the first meeting but the one where these matters were finally decided. During the course of two earlier meetings Duggan, Cohn and some others had come to the conclusion that it would be desirable to invite a group of distinguished Christian American educators to serve on a General Committee (Minutes, 13/6/1933). In preparing the forthcoming meeting Duggan had sent his assistant Murrow a long memo, detailing everything from the menu he thought appropriate for lunch to the way of finding the necessary signatures for the entrance of the non-members to the club. Subsequent meetings took place alternately at the Century or the Chemists’ Club in midtown Manhattan.

During this short overview we have come across three different types of helpers, representing three distinct cultural patterns. First, the Austrians, some of whom were as scared of the Nazis as their colleagues abroad, but who were not able to go further than to express privately, in one of Vienna’s coffee houses, that ‘something should be done!’ However, the implication was that someone else should do it. Obviously this behavioral pattern corresponds to a society where power is highly centralized and individuals rarely take the initiative. Second, the English gentleman, who is ready to help colleagues in need out of
his own pocket. However, his actions take place strictly on a personal level, after scrutinizing the merits of the help-seekers and allocating grants to individuals. And finally the American 'institution man', the type who 'finds in the institution a field for creative self-expression' (Lazarsfeld 1968, 38, note 43). Such people were most effective when they had prior experiences with scholars from abroad and were part of an organizational network of professional educators, devoting time to academic policy, and getting support from wealthy philanthropists who allocate money according to agendas of their own making.

A Comparison of the Different Decision-making Processes

The decision-making process of the A.A.C. was time-consuming but relatively simple. Applicants had to fill in questionnaires about their personal and academic background, give names of people able and willing to write recommendations and indicating their own preparedness to go to particular places worldwide. On the basis of this material the allocation sub-committee recommended to the executive committee 'just what help to give or not to give in individual cases' (Beveridge 1959, 9). All the rest was the responsibility of the refugees themselves, or of people who were willing to provide access to university libraries, laboratories, etc.

Since the New York Committee had to interact with a much wider variety of people and institutions, it established a multi-faceted routine. From the very beginning the inner circle of the Emergency Committee scrutinized each of its steps to avoid irritating the non-Jewish majority. The implicit guideline was carefully observed: to avoid anything that could provoke anti-Semitic sentiments among the educated strata of America's population. The composition of the different committees was carefully planned and the financial sources were concealed at least initially. The response of the professors and university administrators contacted was positive. Only a few declined to join the committee and only one seems to have had particular reservations about the aims of the proposed committee as far as 'so many of our own had been dropped from the rolls' (Duggan, 12/6/1933).

Within four weeks the Committee was formed. One of the last things decided was the name of the organization. After much contemplation the vague expression 'displaced' was chosen, and it is not without irony that the final decision was influenced by the vote of the visiting German professor Otto Hahn, director of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Chemistry in Berlin, who declared categorically that those who become 'affiliated with [...] exile would never be permitted to resume their posts in Germany' (Murrow, 23/6/1933). These debates about an appropriate title produced interesting material regarding the image of Nazi Germany in 1933 and the political judgments of Germans, exiled or not, and foreigners. It is surprising that something like this refugee help organization came into existence at this early stage of the Nazification process in Germany, because most Germans and foreigners still thought of the Hitler government as a transitional one. The turning point came in 1935, when the so-called Nuremberg Laws were announced. This public stand against the Jewish population, defining someone as a Jew if they had one Jewish grandparent and explicitly excluding Jews from German citizenship, changed the opinions of the exiled Germans and most of their supporters abroad.

Since the 'emergency' in Germany was initially expected to be short lived, the Committee established its policy accordingly, thereby providing one more argument for its conception of itself as an emergency unit. Beginning in the midst of June 1933 the officers of the Committee approached the presidents of fourteen universities and colleges, offering to cover all the costs for at least one scholar, whom the university would invite for at least two years. The two-year span was not based on any expectation about the durability of the Nazi dictatorship, but was designed to bypass immigration laws. University teachers and researchers were allowed to enter the USA only if an institution provided them with a contract for at least two years. Given this generous and non-competitive offer one would expect that all universities would seize the opportunity – and most did. In some cases it was difficult to match the wishes of the universities with available German scholars, in other cases health troubles or family affairs held scholars back in Germany. Even in such cases where a temporary settlement for a German professor was not within reach, most administrators and faculty tried to avoid offensive language. There are very few instances where one finds overtly anti-Semitic sentiments in letters from college and university presidents to the Emergency Committee. The case of Harvard is particularly interesting. Despite the fact that early supporters and intermediaries came from there, Duggan had to wait very long until an answer arrived. Finally Harvard's newly installed president, James Conant, regretted that his governing body declined the offer. He did not give any details, but only a few weeks later a public quarrel between Harvard and the Committee supported the impression that the Harvard Corporation had acted out of a mixture of xenophobic and elitist sentiments.
When, on the occasion of the publication of the first Annual Report, the New York Times (January 28, 1934) reported that German scholars were invited to 31 American universities, dryly adding 'with the exception of Harvard,' some people there became disappointed and launched a reply announcing that it was 'unjustified' to exclude Harvard from the list of universities who supported Germans because there were four former Germans on its faculty. But Harvard did not and would not 'make a place [...] for any man because he was an émigré' reported the Times exclusively (January 30, 1934). The four Germans were either not really refugees or did not get a salary from Harvard, but these details were not in the article. The Harvard case is instructive for another reason. Only two years later it was possible for president Conant himself to persuade the bristling Committee to pay for a much-praised German whom Harvard had picked up alone. The Committee gave in against its better intuition and after one year Harvard reversed its initial promise and cancelled the contract with the German historian of science because he allegedly did not measure up to Harvard's requirements. He went back to Germany where he got promotion. This scholar saw himself never as an émigré, and I wonder whether he knew where the money he earned at Harvard came from.

All in all some 160 institutions received financial support from the Committee during the ten years of its activities. The recipients were overwhelmingly located inside the United States; abroad, only the Hebrew University in Jerusalem received support. The vast majority of the institutions supported were located on the East Coast, particularly in New York State. From the start the Committee tried to persuade the Ivy League universities and similar established institutions and colleges to participate in its schema. The Committee only accepted inquiries from the administration of the inviting institution. Presidents from elite institutions always got a friendly response, and in most cases arrangements could be worked out to the satisfaction of both sides. The ordinary college from somewhere in the Midwest or the South did sometimes find it more difficult to approach the Committee successfully. Misunderstandings and errors took place here much more often. Very rarely did a rejected college approach the Committee again, whereas the more confident and experienced institutions returned regularly with inquiries and eventually received more grants. And then, there was the tiny group of outsider institutions which the Committee did not really know and to which it therefore did not want to hand over money. Most of the difficulties arose because the Committee had established from the very beginning that it would contribute only part of the overall amounts needed. The Rockefeller Foundation gave the other half. Sometimes applicants failed because one of these two agencies declined support. Much more successful were applicants who promised additional support from local sources. These additional donations did not always materialize, but the Committee did not have the opportunity to scrutinize the records of the applicants.

In one case, at least, I am convinced that the applicant institution seems to have duped the Committee. The case in question is that of the Institute for Social Research (also known as the 'Frankfurt School'), and is of particular interest, for various reasons. Firstly, it concerns an organization exclusively consisting of emigrant scholars. Secondly, the Institute was to become a kind of icon for different adherents of Neo-Marxism, Critical Theory, Postmodernism and other modern trends. Thirdly the case illustrates differences between German and American culture with regard to the handling of grant applications. The Institute in fact belonged to the top five supported institutions.

In the margin of the very first letter in the correspondence from and to Max Horkheimer and his Institute, you find in Marrow's handwriting: 'B.D. - I give up! Send them all the E.C. pamphlets.' B.D. refers to the secretary of the Committee who finally became not only assistant director but wrote the official history of the Committee in collaboration with Duggan. The letter itself is completely innocent – asking the 'Gentlemen' only to 'send a copy of your prospectus' because their own 'activities are going in the same direction' as those of the Committee. One can only speculate what had happened before this letter arrived on the desk of the Committee. Most likely the later applicant had bothered Marrow over the phone or personally. However, they received some of the publications of the Committee within a short time. It seems they studied the material extensively, but as we will see also successfully. Later in 1935 one of the long-time collaborators of the Institute for Social Research, Karl August Wittfogel, received a well-merited grant, even though he did not strictly fit the narrow definitions of the Emergency Committee, as he was neither a professor nor a Privatdozent. He was, however, a real victim of Nazism, and one of the few early beneficiaries of the Committee who had spent some time in a German Concentration Camp. Wittfogel was the first in a row of grant-holders from the formerly Frankfurt-based Institut für Sozialforschung, and to obtain this money the Institute even offered the Committee a glance in its well-hidden portfolio. In almost all of the following applications the Institute promised to pay the other half out of its own sources, but they seldom did so. This strategy may seem dishonest but
it did at least secure modest incomes for scholars like Franz Neumann, Otto Kirchheimer, Herbert Marcuse, Edgar Zilsel, and Albert Lauterbach. A similarly striking case had a different outcome. When the Yiddish Scientific Institute asked the Committee to subsidize the continuation of the work of Max Weinreich, one of the Committee men from the inner circle gathered information which suggested that the scientific credentials of the applying organization and its leading scholar were questionable. With hindsight one must say that this verdict was wrong and should be traced back to the prejudice against the Jews from Eastern Europe.

To offer some tentative conclusions:
First, contrary to a widely-held attitude that the migration of scholars from Central Europe to the United States is an exhaustively researched topic, I am convinced that there remains much to be discovered, particularly through the close scrutiny of unpublished papers. This leads to my second point. Going through the papers of only one refugee committee gives me the impression that it is impossible to draw any conclusions about the correlation between scientific merits and the amount of support someone was able to earn. Too much depended on accidental circumstances. For the majority of not so well known scholars or for those from disciplines that were not as cosmopolitan as physics or economics, to get entrance to the U.S. academia was dependent on good fortune. The overall success rate must be traced back to the expansion of American higher education and the research in this period.

Thirdly, whereas it is true that the migration of the German-speaking scholars made up only a tiny fraction of the overall immigration to Britain and America during the twentieth century, this particular transfer of people, ideas, networks and scholarly practices is still one of the most fascinating phases of recent intellectual history. The ‘brain drain’ from Europe started long before the expulsion by the Nazis and did not end in 1945, but the intellectual migration of the 1930s is the only one where people of equal rank and merit were supported by their former and later competitors for positions, grants, and fellowships.

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Bibliography


DOROTHEA McEWAN

MAPPING THE TRADE ROUTES OF THE MIND: THE WARBURG INSTITUTE

In this case study I shall examine the aims and functions of the Warburg Institute (WI) in London and its forerunner in Hamburg, the Kulturwissenschaftliche Bibliothek Warburg (KBW). On the basis of papers and letters kept in the archive of the WI I will try to summarize the diverse functions performed by Aby Warburg himself and his staff from roughly 1902 to his death in 1929 and beyond to 1933 in Hamburg; and then, the new objectives of the WI from 1934 to 1944 in London. By analysing the in-house definitions of the vital activities of the KBW and WI, I hope to place this remarkable example of 'intellectual migration' in its cultural context.

Warburg, who was born in 1866, as the son of a banker in Hamburg, studied art history in Bonn, Florence and Strasbourg and became interested in the Florentine Renaissance and particularly its revival of pagan antiquity. The study of the survival of pagan antiquity in European religion, literature, art, the meaning of symbols and the processes of social memory occupied Warburg throughout his life. In 1902 he decided to create a library which would be devoted to researching these issues and, more generally, the history of European culture. Financial support was forthcoming from his family and, if Warburg had overdrawn his annual budget yet again, he would quip: 'Other rich families have their racing stable, you have my library - and it is worth much more' (Heise 1947, 23). His library was the instrument - the laboratory - of a private scholar, supplemented in time by a photographic collection; it was open to scholars who either approached Warburg or were invited by him. In November 1919, one year after Warburg fell seriously ill, his family appointed the young Viennese scholar Fritz Saxl to run the library in his absence. Saxl, who had collaborated with Warburg before World War I and had gained the trust of the family, opened up the privately run library to members of the public and turned it into a research institute with lectures, courses and publications. Saxl ran the library until Warburg's return from the sanatorium in Kreuzlingen, Switzerland, in August 1924 and became his deputy until Warburg's death in October 1929. Saxl was then appointed director by the family and in 1933 transferred the library to London.