

THE "UNACCEPTABLES"

American Foundations
and Refugee Scholars
between the Two Wars and after



P.I.E.-Peter Lang

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Long-Term Consequences of Short-Term Fellowships*

Christian FLECK

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Despite its obvious significance funding of research is rarely treated in histories of the sciences. There are usually almost no references to this aspect of scientific development in theory-centered histories of the social or the human sciences (*e.g.* Schumpeter 1954, Bottomore & Nisbet 1978, Smith 1997). Only studies on the institutionalization of particular disciplines reveal something about the financial side of the scientific endeavor (for sociology see Turner & Turner 1990) or studies on less respected subjects, like empirical social research (Platt 1996), applied research (Converse 1987), or organizational units as universities, research centers, or departments (*e.g.* Bulmer 1982, Dahrendorf 1995, Abbott 1999). Of course, there are sociology of sci-

* I would like to thank the following institutions for making material accessible to me: Rockefeller Archive Center, Pocantico Hill, NY; Harvard Archives, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA; The New York Public Library, Columbia University, Ford Foundation, all in New York; and the London School of Economics and Political Science.

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ence papers and monographs dealing with financing but only few studies from this perspective actually discuss the funding of the social sciences at length (*e.g.* Deutsch, Markovits, Platt 1986). One can find more about funding in biographies, but for obvious reasons a comparative approach is hardly prevalent in this sort of texts.

A special aspect of funding concerns the granting of fellowships by Foundations. One of the most influential donors for the social sciences was the Rockefeller Foundation (hereafter RF) and preceding it the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial (LSRM) who distributed fellowships from the 1920s to the 1960s. (General information on RF in Fosdick 1952, Nielsen 1972). Studies of the RF have focused on the organization itself and its officers (Coben 1966, Kohler 1976, Karl & Katz 1981, Bulmer & Bulmer 1981), the promotion of certain scientific disciplines (Lomax 1977, Kohler 1978, Fisher 1983, Bulmer 1984, Fisher 1984, Craver 1986a), the role the Foundation played in the creation of research organizations like the National Bureau of Economic Research or the Social Science Research Council (Craver & Leijonhufvud 1987, Fisher 1993), or the importance of the Rockefeller funds for developments in the social and behavioral sciences in different countries (Craver 1986b, Turner & Turner 1990, Dahrendorf 1995, Platt 1996). Previous studies on fellowship programs have been restricted so far to an analysis of the policies of the Foundation and its officials. To my knowledge there have been no investigations of the groups of recipients, on their social, intellectual and academic background, or of the contribution of fellowships to the permanent migration of scientists, the so-called brain-drain. Occasionally one finds in biographies references to the crucial role Rockefeller fellowships played in the survival of refugees from Nazi Germany (*e.g.* Coser 1984, Craver 1986b), but there are no prosopographic analyses investigating groups of fellowship holders as cohorts or generational units.

After a short overview of the Rockefeller policy with regard to fellowships I will turn to a more detailed analysis of the fellows from German-speaking countries (Germany, Austria, Switzerland, and students from the German University in Prague) from the beginnings of the program up to the end of the 1960s. I will then turn to the Austrian case and discuss the particularities of this country that went through an overproduction of talents and the role forced migration played in the transfer of Austrians abroad. And finally I will try to compare the three German-speaking countries with respect to the migration of social scientists in the period from the mid-1920s to the 1960s. Even though here and there outlooks to the post-WW II world will be included for

comparative reasons my analysis will concentrate primarily on the years before the outbreak of WW II.

This study is based on published sources from Rockefeller Foundation (1951, 1955, and 1972) but uses the Foundation's administrative papers, now at the Rockefeller Archive Center in Pocantico Hills, New York.¹

The Fellowship Program of RF

Between 1917 and 1950 the total sum of recipients from the different RF programs providing fellowships, and later also scholarships, amounted to 6,342 (see table 1); up to 1968 an additional 2,700 fellows received awards, but no detailed statistics were published. In accord with the traditional philanthropic orientation of the early RF most fellowships went to public health, the education of midwives and nurses, and contributed to combating epidemic diseases in connection with the International Health Program (see Fosdick 1952, Shaplen 1964). RF also sponsored basic research in many sciences and indirectly another fellowship program, administered by the Social Science Research Council, which provided American, in particular US, social scientists with one-year support for enhancing their research competence or pursuing original research on their own. More than 1,000 social scientists from North America received one of these SSRC fellowships between 1925 and 1950 (I will not deal with this program here).

¹ The entries in the published directories offer information on name, year of birth, country of residence at the time of the nomination, year and institution of graduation, position held before the fellowship, RF program to which the applicant was assigned, country of study, special fields of interest, and addresses in 1950 and 1970 respectively. The archival material, especially the fellowship cards contain data for citizenship, education, present and prospective (after the fellowship) position, marital status, number of children, duration of fellowship, amount of the stipend and detailed information about the activities during the fellowship. Unfortunately, there is no information about the socio-cultural background (father's occupation, religion etc.).

Table 1: Distribution of Rockefeller fellowships by scientific disciplines 1917-1950

Discipline	Fellowships		Financing (in % of total)
	percentage	(N)	
Public Health	29.6	(1877)	} 37.1
Nurses	10.9	(689)	
Medical Sciences	19.9	(1263)	21.1
Natural Sciences	19.2	(1219)	17.4
Social Sciences	13.0	(823)	16.6
Humanities	7.4	(471)	5.9
Total	100.0	(6342)	98.1*

Source: RF Directory 1951, Appendix; my calculation.

* Additional 1.8% to the China Program of RF.

Approximately one eighth of all RF fellowship recipients were classified as social scientists. On average every year nearly thirty social scientists received a stipend. (During WW II practically no social scientist received a fellowship in contrast to medicine and science where the programs continued uninterruptedly.)

From the end of WW I up to 1950 RF used more than 28 million US \$ for the fellowship program.² The Foundation did not draw any significant distinction between *hard* and *soft* science, costly and cheap branches. Each fellow received on average US \$ 2,964 per year (bear in mind that not all fellows were abroad for a full academic year), approximately at this time the regular annual salary of a junior University professor.

RF emphasized particular disciplines (as shown in table 1) and channeled its funds to support certain countries. Table 2 illustrates the preferential treatment of the Anglo-Saxon countries. In all disciplines the USA or England (with Scotland and Wales) rank highest. RF did not distribute the money equally among the disciplines. As marginal as the sums were in the whole, US humanities fellows got two third, and the Europeans nearly nothing. One could interpret this pattern as resulting from the fact that the North Americans had to catch up in these fields. A similar pattern emerged in the more practical branch of public

² The fellowship program never captured more than 10% of all RF expenses. The biggest shares were spent in 1926 and in 1965, respectively (Rockefeller Foundation, 1972, p. 411).

health, where RF subsidized less-developed countries like China, Mexico and Yugoslavia disproportionately. In the cases of sciences committed to basic research RF sponsored primarily more advanced countries.

Table 2: Fellowship recipients by country of residence 1917-1950: Ranking and amount of distributed money by disciplines

Country	Public Health		Medicine		Science		Social Sciences		Humanities	
	Rank	Money in %	Rank	Money in %	Rank	Money in %	Rank	Money in %	Rank	Money in %
USA	1.	25.2	3.	6.2	1.	14.1	4.	6.0	1.	62.4
UK			1.	10.8	3.	9.3	1.	13.1	4.	2.8
CDN	2.	8.3	4.	4.0					3.	3.4
Germany			2.	6.5	2.	12.3	2.	9.6		
France			5.	3.8	4.	5.2	3.	8.6		
China	3.	4.8			5.	4.5			2.	4.2
Poland							5.	5.0		
YU	5.	3.8								
India	4.	4.0								
Mexico									5.	2.5
P. Rico									5.	2.5

Source: RF Directory 1951, my calculation.

The decisions RF made were not always consistent. To enhance underdeveloped countries and to strengthen the hot spots of first-class research at the same time led to ambivalences (Bulmer & Bulmer 1981, Bulmer 1984). During and after the Great Depression the support of applied economics, especially business cycle research, contributed massively to the growth of research centers like the National Bureau of Economic Research, Brookings Institution, the economic intelligence section of the League of Nations, the London School of Economics, Harvard University's department of economics and its business research center, and other places where business cycle research began, like the Austrian Institute of Trade Cycle Research (cf. Shaplen 1964, 144, Grossman 1982, Craver 1986 a). Accordingly, nearly half of all social science fellows came from economics.

On the other hand, Beardsley Ruml, director of the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial from 1925 until its consolidation with the Rockefeller Foundation in 1929, established the policy of primarily supporting bright young graduates, which almost immediately became

the kind of official ideology. This preference didn't fit in with the strategy of supporting more or less established research centers. Such ambivalence were the rule, not the exception.

The fellows in economics illustrate this ambivalence further. Countries with underdeveloped research in economics, summarized in table 3 as "others" (mainly non-Western, less-developed countries), sent more economists abroad than the more developed countries.

A different picture emerges in political science. More than every second US fellow from the social sciences was a political scientist, one quarter of the French social science fellows originated from this discipline and these two countries and the British occupied half of the political science fellowships.

Table 3: Number of social science fellowships recipients, by country of residence and discipline

Country/-ies	Economics	Sociology	Political Science	Other Social Sciences	Total	in %
Germany	38	12	7	20	77	9.4
Austria	13	3	5	11	32	3.9
Switzerland	4	1	3	5	13	1.6
U.K.	43	13	16	43	115	14.0
France	25	11	19	16	71	8.7
West-EU	20	11	0	11	42	5.1
Poland	16	14	3	8	41	5.0
East-EU	48	16	11	24	99	12.1
North-EU	46	16	6	23	91	11.1
South-EU	27	3	5	6	41	5.0
USA	10	5	28	7	50	6.1
AUS	14	1	4	13	32	3.9
CDN	1	3	1	7	12	1.5
ASIA	15	14	6	8	43	5.2
OTHERS	31	8	7	15	61	7.4
Total	351	131	121	217	820	-
in %	42.8	16.0	14.8	26.4	-	100

Legend: UK = England and Scotland; West-EU = Belgium, Netherlands; East-EU = Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia; North-EU: Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden; South-EU = Greece, Italy, Turkey; AUS = Australia; ASIA = China, India, Japan; OTHERS= Brasilia, Mexico and 49 other primarily non-western countries.

Source: RF Directory 1951, my calculation.

The field of sociology also appears somewhat patchy. There was strong support for Polish sociologists, even although Poland was only included in the fellowship program some years after the merger of the LSRM and RF when a new group of Foundation representatives traveled through Europe and found Polish candidates particularly promising (finally 11% of all sociology fellows came from Poland) and a significant portion came from Asia (11% of all sociologists came from Asia and one third of all Asian social science fellows did their research in the field of sociology). While Poland's sociology was at this time relatively advanced, and thanks to the influence of Florian Znaniecki not far from US American standards one couldn't say the same for Asian sociology.

The data summarized in Table 3 do not support an interpretation of the RF policy in terms of Merton's well-known Matthew effect, emphasizing "the accruing of large increments of peer recognition to scientists of great repute for particular contributions in contrast to the minimizing [...] of such recognition for scientists who have not yet made their mark". (Merton 1996, 320). On the contrary, the fellowship program demonstrates that the development of the social sciences could be become the target of a kind of science policy long before this specific term came into currency.

German-Speaking Social Science Fellows

In 1924 the first four German-speaking fellows, the psychologist Charlotte Buhler, the economists Ludwig Fritscher, the political scientist Eric Voegelin from Vienna and Immanuel Fauser, presumably an agrarian economist from Berlin, were nominated, joining twelve other European fellows on their way to the USA.³ A little more than 100 fellows were nominated up to 1941 when the USA entered WW II and civilian transport across the Atlantic became impossible. The last German who got a fellowship was Albert O. Hirschman, who lived in exile since 1933 and started his fellowship in 1941. Up to 1964, when the last and youngest fellow of the whole sample, the 29-year-old German political scientist Peter Weber-Schaefer, started his fellowship, nearly two hundred scholars from Germany, Switzerland and Austria received a fellowship from RF (a small group received more than one fellow-

³ Seven came from Britain, three from France, and one from Ireland, and Czechoslovakia respectively. The Rockefeller Foundation, *Social Science Fellowship of the Rockefeller Foundation 1924-1932*, Paris 1933 (RF, RG 1.2, Box 50, Folder 382, RAC) and Rockefeller Foundation, 1951.

ship, but I won't consider this aspect here). Two thirds started before 1941 and only one third after 1947 (in the interim the social science fellowship program was discontinued as mentioned earlier). Table 4 shows the distribution of fellows between the two periods and their disciplinary specializations.

**Table 4: German-speaking RF Fellows
by selected disciplines and period**

Discipline	Germany		Austria		Switzerland		Total (incl. others)	
	before 41	after 45	before 41	after 45	before 41	after 45	before 41	after 45
Economics	34	23	12	5	2	7	57	39
Sociology	13	5	3	3	0	0	21	8
Polit. Science	7	1	5	1	1	0	15	3
Others	23	8	10	3	3	2	39	13
Total	77	37	30	11	6	9	132	63

The gender distribution was massively one-sided: During nearly four decades only twelve women (or 6%) received a fellowship. Curiously enough, only three women, or 5% (the economists Eva Bossmann and Elisabeth Liefmann-Keil, and the sociologist Renate Mayntz) were nominated after WW II, while before 1941 nine women (or 7%) received a fellowship. Since there are no statistics about the sex proportion for students from particular fields of study over the period under investigation it is almost impossible to propose a sound interpretation.⁴ I can only speculate on the reasons and causes underlying this skewed distribution. Perhaps the decline over the years is a long-term consequence of the anti-feminism of the Nazis, resulting in a under-representation of women in the student body after WW II, or the scarcity of female students between the wars draw more attention to the minority, whereas after WW II men and women were in stronger competition with each other. But whatever the ultimate cause might be the astonishing small number of women is remarkable.

The age distribution falls short of later developed patterns of socially expected durations of academic education. At their respective

⁴ Until the end of the 1920s the over-all share of female students was below 10% in Germany, and a little bit higher in Nationalökonomie (economics), Titze 1987, vol. 1, pp. 156 and 165. Cf. Huerkamp 1996.

starting point approximately one quarter of the fellows were younger than 27 years old; in the pre-war period the percentage was much higher, 30%, while after WW II only 8% started their fellowship at an age younger than 27 years. One of the youngest was the Viennese economist Oskar Morgenstern, born 1902, who started his fellowship in the same year he received his Ph.D., in 1925. Between 1924 and 1941 an additional twelve students were younger than 26. After 1945 no one started so young. For the whole period 60% were younger than 32 years when they began their fellowship, and an additional quarter were younger than 37 years. The age-distribution underscores the claim that RF supported mainly young bright men (seldom women, as we have already seen).

It seems to be clear that receiving a fellowship couldn't be the result of individual competence, effort or visibility alone. There must be an influence coming from teachers and mentors. One's own position in or relation to an intellectual network connecting local representatives or patrons acting as intermediaries to the Paris based European office of RF played a crucial role (see table 5 for the concentration of the fellows in particular universities). The files at the Rockefeller Archive Center corroborate this assumption and memoirs of former RF fellows provide additional evidence. Lazarsfeld's memoir from 1969, for example, tells the story of his good fortune in finally obtaining a fellowship he even did not know that he was nominated for. (Lazarsfeld 1969, pp. 275 f.). Probably he was not even aware of the background of his nomination at the time of his memoir because he was seen then as one who was close to the Viennese School of Economics and would have made "psychological contributions to economic research" during his fellowship term.⁵ Lazarsfeld's autobiographical report is still the only one that gives detailed information about the process of becoming a Rockefeller Fellow. Many of the other autobiographers only report that the fellowship happened, that they got one, or mix up the whole story by presenting the fellowship offer as a kind of award ceremony.⁶

⁵ Letter from John Van Sickle to Stacy May, June 21, 1933 (RF, RG 1.2, Series 100 international, Box 49, Folder 376, RAC) Fellowship Card Paul F. Lazarsfeld (RAC).

⁶ Fürer-Haimendorf, 1990, p. 7; Buhler 1972, pp. 25f.; and the appropriate entries in the two volumes edited by Fleck 1996, and Bolte & Neidhardt 1998 respectively, with autobiographical reminiscences by sociologists from the post WW II generation.

Table 5: Graduation of Rockefeller Fellows, by universities

Country/ City	Period 1 before WW II	Period 2 after WW II	Total
Germany	80	35	115
of that:			
Berlin	13	2	15
Bonn	3	2	5
Frankfurt	5	7	12
Freiburg	5	2	7
Hamburg	7	2	10
Heidelberg	8	2	11
Cologne	3	5	8
Kiel	7	2	9
Leipzig	6	0	6
Munich	7	2	9
Austria	32	9	41
of that:			
Vienna	28	9	37
Switzerland	6	9	15
Others	9	7	16
Total	127	60	187

During the early years of the fellowship program the decision just who should get a fellowship lay completely in the hands of a small group of national representatives of the LSRM, while the distribution of fellowships was restricted to countries where such advisers were in charge. In Austria the historian Alfred Francis Pribram acted on his own, as did economists Alfred Ammann and Joseph Macek for German and Czech students respectively in Prague. In Germany a committee of high-ranking University professors and policy-makers nominated the fellows during the existence of the LSRM. After the reorganization of the Foundations in 1929 RF's officials took over the selection of fellows. Candidates could send in applications independently but their cases were always checked with local confidants. The former representatives and the increasing number of former fellows acted as gatekeepers and referees.

The questions whether there were national, political, or any other clearly established preferences, or whether RF distinguished between

special kinds of scientific orientation ('paradigms') or inhibited particular biases are difficult to handle. Over the years many things changed unintentionally, some on purpose, and guidelines and explicit preferences were reformed regularly. Undisputed were two criteria which were applied throughout the whole period under investigation: First, regardless of what someone intended to do during his fellowship it had to be a kind of inductive research, as the Foundation's officers called their preferred style of doing research. It meant that it should be empirical research and no speculative theorizing. Surprisingly enough a lot of exceptions were made, otherwise it would not have been possible that philosophers like Voegelin, Leo Strauss, Jacob Taubes, Elizabeth Feist-Hirsch, or Ernst Topitsch, none of them known as an inductive researcher, could be accepted as social scientists committed to realistic research, to quote a term often used synonymously to inductive. But they and some more were nominated. Secondly, every selection decision was based on the judgment of more than one referee, thus forestalling later peer review procedures.

Table 4 shows not only the over-representation of economics but also a further shifting in the composition of special fields. The number of fellows from economics increased after WW II in all three countries, whereas sociology and political science, practically non-existent at the universities before the war, received more attention before than after WW II. This finding is a striking argument against all authors suggesting that there was a close affinity between the institutionalization of sociology and political science in post-war Germany and the re-education policy of the American occupation forces there, whereby Foundations were seen as instrumental to US foreign policy.

Just as striking as the preferential treatment of economics is the *disproportion* between the two time periods. Yet it would give a false impression to assume that the decline of fellowships after WW II was brought on only by a shift in the policy of the Foundation. Indeed RF shifted its focus from Europe to the less developed countries but the differences between the three German-speaking countries reveal what happened between the years when RF started its European program and the 1960s when it gave up its commitment to help European social scientists to recover from the aftermath of a war. Switzerland, not affected by dictatorship and war, sent more fellows abroad after WW II than before. During the first period Switzerland nominated 4%, Austria 23% and Germany 58% (an additional 14% German-speaking applicants from elsewhere, primarily from the German Charles University in

Prague). In period 2 the Swiss share climbed to 14%, again 58% came from Germany, while Austria's rate dropped to 17%.

To put this in perspective we could compare the shares of fellowship recipients with their homeland, the numbers of students and University personnel. In 1930 approximately 100,000 students attended twenty-three universities in Germany, whereas approximately 7,000 students enrolled in seven Swiss universities⁷ and nearly 15,000 students populated the three universities remaining from the larger academic market of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire. Around 1930 the ratios of Austrians to Germans, and Swiss respectively looked very different at the following three strata:

	Austria : Germany	Austria : Switzerland
Students	1 : 6.6	1 : 0.5
Faculty	1 : 3.3	1 : 0.6
Rockefeller Fellows	1 : 2.5	1 : 0.2

These data underscore what the officers of the RF noted more than once in their inter-office correspondence from Paris to New York: Austria produced more talents than it was able to subsidize. As a consequence, and in accordance with the policy of the RF – *i.e.*, to grant fellowships only to persons who were willing to return to their country after the end of the term abroad and who had something like a job in view – some RF officers argued in favor of reducing the number of Austrian fellows. One victim of this policy was the mathematician-turned-economist Abraham Wald whose nomination by Oskar Morgenstern was postponed more than once – until Hitler's troops decided instead of the reluctant RF officers. Wald fled immediately after the *Anschluss* and got his first job in the States subsidized from the special funds the Rockefeller Foundation had established to support displaced scholars.

The Strange Austrian Case

The over-production of talents in Austria could be traced back to various roots. The role Vienna played as the metropolis of the Hapsburg Empire contributed to a constellation, which for a very long period was called the "hydrocephalus syndrome". It refers to the presence of better-educated civil servants and other white-collar employees in Vienna because there were the different headquarters for the huge

⁷ The three German-speaking universities, Basel, Bern and Zurich, were home for two thirds of the students and a slightly more than half of all faculty.

empire, and well-educated fathers sought for their sons, rarely in these years for their daughters, similar status by investing in education. Another reason, which is not independent from the former one, is the higher proportion of Jews or people of Jewish origin in Vienna compared to all other German-speaking University cities.⁸ A third factor could be found in the troubles the Austrian governments experienced throughout the whole interwar period. While the Weimar Republic went through a period of economic recovery in the midst of the 1920s, the Austrian government restricted the federal budget much more and the consequences were visible especially in higher education where the over-aged faculty was a well-known phenomenon and could be seen by everyone. It seems also that the Austrian adviser Pribram exerted pressure on the RF more than his German counterparts, and due to the fact that many of the earliest nominees from Vienna turned out to be good choices they themselves became influential in the selection process of their followers.

But why did these pattern change so dramatically over the short period of seven years of Nazi rule in Austria? And, why was the impact of the same dictatorship on Germany weaker than in Austria? Both questions are related to the one, just how many social scientists were forced out of Austria.

First of all one has to emphasize that there was more than one wave of migration in Austria. One could begin with the 1920s when an increasing number of scholars left Austria, partly as a reaction to the influx of educated people after the breakdown of the Hapsburg Empire, when every citizen had to choose between one of the follower states. Many of the University graduates, referred to as *Akademiker*, earning nothing more than their cultural capital, to use Bourdieuan distinctions, opted not so much for the tiny new republic *Deutsch-Österreich* than for the advantage to live in the then still great and vital city of Vienna. During the 1920s educated people were driven out of Austria primarily because of the job market. In part Vienna functioned as a "transit station" when, for example, Hungarians fleeing the Bolsheviks and later the anti-Bolshevik counterrevolutionaries were stranded for shorter or longer periods in Vienna before leaving again for Berlin,

⁸ According to statistics published by the Bureau für Statistik der Juden (1905 and 1908) the rate of Jewish students in Prussia in the first decade of the 20th century was about 9% whereas the comparable number for Austria was nearly 16% before the collapse of the empire. Later data are not very trustworthy, because of the nationalist' overestimation of the Jewish problem.

Leipzig, Oberlin, or Moskva.⁹ One could call the migration during the 1920s the usual brain drain from an over-producing market to a more receptive one. Yet I'd like to add that even then there were also political reasons that forced scholars to leave Austria. For example, the famous legal theorist Hans Kelsen got angry at constitutional reforms Austria's conservative government initiated in the late 1920s, which resulted in a change of *his* constitution in the direction of a more authoritarian regime. Kelsen was the main author of the first Republican constitution, which came into effect in 1920. He left Vienna for Cologne where he had to leave involuntarily when the Nazis seized power; he accepted an offer from the (German-speaking) Charles University in Prague, which he again had to leave during the *Sudetenland* crisis and the rising anti-Semitism in 1938. After a short interlude at the *Institut universitaire des hautes études internationales*, in Geneva, he came to the USA, in his late 1950s. There he faced a harsh time because he could not get a regular professorship and made a living from temporary affiliations, for example at Harvard, where he taught at the Law School. He finally settled in California where he got an offer from the University of California at Berkeley to join its department of international law. At retirement age Kelsen change from constitutional law to international law, which for a long time he had considered to be an improper, nearly inexistent entity.

Joseph A. Schumpeter pursued a less dramatic career as compared to Kelsen's. After resigning from the Ministry of Finance in the early 1920s, he tried his luck with the world of banking and failed – not the last famous economist whom the real world of finance taught a lesson to. Later on he returned to a University post, not only to pay his debts that he felt was his duty as a man of honor. Just to ease this burden earlier he accepted an offer from Harvard, where he got a salary of \$ 12,000, back in 1932 a considerably well-paid professor.¹⁰

⁹ Oszkár Jászi finally became a professor at Oberlin College, near Cleveland, Ohio; Georg Lukács spent some years in Vienna but eventually ended up in Moskva as a member of the nomenclature, Ernő Manheim studied under Hans Freyer in Leipzig before fleeing via London to the USA, Michael Polyáni held a directorship at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Chemistry in Berlin before the Nazi takeover of power which drove him again into exile. Cf. as an overview on the Hungarian intellectual Diaspora: Congdon 1991.

¹⁰ Joseph A. Schumpeter Papers, HUG (FP) – 4.7, Box 1: A – Bo, Folder Becker visa case (Harvard University Archives).

The next wave, the first with a primarily political background happened around 1933. But unlike Germany the first scholars who became victims were not Jewish, liberal, or left-wing academics but astonishingly, Austrian Nazis who were forced out of their University posts by the right-wing Catholic regime, which was also opposed to the Left. There were practically no members of the Social Democratic Workers Party in the universities, not to mention Communists. Most of the few Social Democrats didn't lose their jobs but were not allowed to teach political subjects anymore. The only prominent "part-time sociologists"¹¹ who were driven out of Austria at this time was the philosopher Heinrich Gomperz and the "organizational man" of the Vienna Circle of Logical Positivism, Otto Neurath. At this time Sigmund Freud lost his right to teach at the University which was without practical consequences because he already stopped teaching long before.

During the authoritarian regime the "normal" brain drain continued but at a slower pace. Especially members of the so-called fourth generation of the Austrian School of Economics, who were offered posts in Geneva, London, Harvard, and Buffalo eagerly seized the opportunities. Neither Hayek nor Haberler left Vienna for political reasons. Only Machlup could be regarded as a victim of racial prejudice. He left Austria since anti-Semitic professors denied him the habilitation because he, as all other Jews, was regarded as precocious, as compared to his Gentile contemporaries. One of the professors, a count in the days when aristocratic titles were not prohibited by law, added that therefore it would be unfair to the Gentiles to promote him at the age of twenty-something (Craver 1986). Ludwig Mises' acceptance of a part-time professorship in Geneva was a result of his quarrels with the economists at the University in Vienna. Anti-Semitism played a minor role in this fight between rival paradigms.

During the early 1930s conditions in Austria worsened, more with regard to the lack of political freedom than as a consequence of specific restrictions of academic freedom. Both the psychologists around the Buhler couple and the economists around Morgenstern's Business Cycle Research Institute – the two most influential and most productive research centers of this time – did business as usual during the takeover of power by Engelbert Dollfuss and the following years of authoritarian rule under his successor Kurt Schuschnigg, backed by Italy's dictator Benito Mussolini.

¹¹ Cf. my more detailed conceptual and historiographical approach in Fleck 1989.

Only social scientists active in the underground movement of the Revolutionary Socialists were arrested. One of them, Marie Jahoda, then head of the *Wirtschaftspsychologische Forschungsstelle*, a research unit which became famous as the micro-environment responsible for the study *Die Arbeitslosen von Marienthal* (1933), was in jail for more than half a year. Subsequent to her release she left for London, and only came to the United States after the war. But she was the exception. The majority stayed in Vienna, and did not experience political threats or persecution. Only the mood became miserable.

The third wave of emigration, around the *Anschluss* in 1938, was the biggest one. At this time political and racist persecution reached the universities too. Within two months the Nazi regime repeated in former Austria what it had done in Germany at a slower pace between 1933 and 1938.

Before elaborating on the 1938 migration let me make a jump forward in time and draw attention to the fact that after the defeat of the Nazi regime a political motivated migration took place once again. At this time former Nazi party members from lower ranks who were unwilling to accept immediately the new ideological conditions by erasing their past political affinities lost their jobs and the brightest ones emigrated. To name only the most prominent figures of this migration wave I would like to mention the case of the former Natural Science Rockefeller Fellow, Ludwig Bertalanffy who immigrated to the US, while Konrad Lorenz, the later Nobel laureate, went only to Germany. Both were later honored, e.g. in a biographical entry in the *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*. In a broader sense these men were political émigrés as well, because both men had been forced out of their University positions due to their affiliation with the Nazi party. They were accompanied by a small but later distinguished group of students or graduates who saw no future in the devastated Austria of the 1940s and 1950s. The sociologist Peter L. Berger, the philosopher Paul Feyerabend, and the psychologist Walter Toman are just three of them.¹²

To come back to the Nazi purge of 1938, the picture is not entirely clear. On the one hand, about 400 scientists of all branches, affiliated in some way to the universities, lost their jobs, or 40 to 60%, depending on whom one includes in the calculations, were forced out. How-

¹² Again, all of them were very young at the time of their emigration. Older ones like the concentration camp survivor Benedikt Kautsky could not find a place to stay in the USA during an early trip after WW II.

ever, the number of social scientists who were dismissed from their University posts is very small.

Only few of the dismissed social scientists went abroad. Scholars who became well known later and had held regular professorships until 1938 were Eric Voegelin, Charlotte and Karl Buhler, both left Vienna as early as possible. Roughly half a dozen more, then and today widely unknown professors from different branches of the social sciences were dismissed and emigrated afterwards. About 80% of the émigrés ended up in the US. Most of the dismissed went into so-called "inner emigration", only a few suffered short terms of imprisonment. I found about ten social scientists – again in the broadest sense of this concept – who were deported to concentration camps – some today unknown members of the Catholic Church, some spokesmen of the authoritarian government, and from the Left Bruno Bettelheim and Paul Neurath, both released before the start of the war, and Käthe Leichter and Benedikt Kautsky, only the latter survived. A very promising young economist, Karl Schlesinger, committed suicide.

Most of the later émigrés lost their jobs outside the University or went abroad without leaving regular places of work and some of the refugees were underemployed or unemployed before they left Austria. I guess that both the extent of the emigration wave and the small number of victims can be explained by this special situation of former underemployment, job insecurity and insignificant occupational bonds to their native environment.

To reach a more definite picture of the number of social science émigrés I carried out a stricter investigation. Let me explain the design at some length. In trying to identify social scientists in Austria between wars it is pointless to look only to the universities. I therefore decided to construct a sample of social scientists without any reference to occupational positions within or outside the universities and without any preconception with regard to the emigration aspect. I wanted to have data at hand to say something about communalities and differences between refugees and "remainers". How to do this?

I made the claim that someone could be accepted as a social scientist if he published between the middle of the 1920s and the middle of the 1950s at least one article or wrote at least two reviews in one of the social scientific journals in these thirty years. I have collected a set of journal of all the then well-known journals published in Austria, Germany (n = 13), and England, France and the US (n = 25). The reason I included non-German journals is a simple one: The generation of Austrian émigrés seemed to have been a relatively

young cohort. Consequently, it would have been difficult for them to publish papers before they were forced out of Austria. Political and racial prejudices may have also played a role in preventing them from publishing. Additionally, one must bear in mind that politically active young University graduates submitted their first papers mostly to journals of opinion of their own respective ideological in-group and hence avoided academic journals.¹³

On the other hand it seems fair against the "remainers" to widen the temporal framework because some of them did not had a chance to publish their papers during the Nazi period but afterwards. Serving in the *Wehrmacht* and detained additional years as prisoners of war caused delays in academic careers. To take this point into account I extended the observation period up to 1955 so that everyone who was *silenced during the war or had the burden of a second period of studying* had a chance to publish something, at least one paper. It is no easy task to define who was an Austrian. In this sample Austrian does not mean citizenship or place of birth or other criteria of nationality. It only means that someone lived or studied in Austria more than two years (most of the population has stronger bonds to Austria, so the former is just the bottom line or minimal definition).

Some results are surprising: from a total of 313 persons, 65% became émigrés. One fifth of the "remainers" experienced some sort of persecution by the Nazis, ranging from dismissal, short-term imprisonment, to homicide in the camps.

I checked the data more than once, but the ratio of two émigrés to one "remainder" is very stable and indeed surprising, compared with the overall rate of migration in Austria and Germany. Around 1,500 scholars of all fields who held at least a habilitation left Germany after 1933, which is about one fifth of all people of similar rank. Admittedly, the 65% rate of emigration is congruent with estimates of German émigré economists and sociologists, but the authors do not explain how they obtained their results.

Remember the small number of female Rockefeller Fellows I mentioned before – 7%. I found nearly same rate of women in this sample, 9.5%.

¹³ Mario Jahoda, Paul Lazarsfeld, Hans Zeisel, Alexander Gerschenkron and many more published their first more or less scientific paper in Social Democratic magazines, like *Der Kampf* or *Arbeit und Wirtschaft*, both journals beyond comparison to their present day counterparts.

In the hope that I am not straining the reader's patience I will present one last quantitative finding concerning the age distribution (see table 6).

Table 6: Comparison of two groups of Austrian social scientists

Birth cohort	Émigrés		"Remainers"		All
	N	Percentage	N	Percentage	
Before 1869	5	41.7	7	58.3	12
1870-1879	11	52.4	10	47.6	21
1880-1889	20	58.8	14	41.2	34
1890-1899	39	76.5	12	23.5	51
1900-1909	81	88.0	11	12.0	92
After 1910	40	93.0	3	7.0	43
All	196	77.5	57	22.5	253

The result is relatively clear and convincing: The émigré population was characteristically younger than the "remainder's". The difference in the mean value is ten years. The median year of birth for the "remainder" is 1887, but for the émigrés 1901.

I only found one publication that offers comparable data for the German émigré sociologists (Wittebur 1991). The author of this Ph.D. thesis collected data from 139 German sociologists and made some calculations. The share of women in his study is smaller than in my sample, only 6%, and the age distribution deviates from the Austrian refugees too. It did not come near to the Austrian "remainers": the German émigrés were born around 1897, ten years before the Austrian "remainers" and on the average were four years older than their Austrian counterparts. This last difference becomes weaker if one considers that the majority of the German refugees left their country of origin some years earlier than the Austrians. The refugee population was a comparably young cohort, as always when migration happens, one could add.

A more comprehensive portrait of the Austrian émigrés would have to investigate in greater detail the following particularities one encounters by analyzing the archival material in traditional historio-sociographical ways:

First, most Austrians left without a professional career and looking at their future at this point, one could say without the burden of overly

high aspirations. It seems that this was an advantage in the long run. While every full professor who migrated felt uncomfortable in view of the shrunken opportunities he found abroad, it was easier for younger people to become acquainted with the rules, habits and opportunity structures of their new environment. Telling evidence is the correspondence between German or Austrian Gentile professors who thought about migration but eventually decided not to go abroad because of unpleasant peculiarities abroad. Only a small number of émigrés established themselves within a short period of time in a position comparable to their former position. Of all German-speaking social scientists one could only enumerate Martin Buber at the Hebrew University at Jerusalem and Paul Tillich, who went from Columbia, via Harvard to Chicago.¹⁴ Nearly all former full or associated professors from Germany had a tough struggle after their migration. One part ended up in the enclave of the New School for Social Research, which was founded on the premise that its faculty would not compete with Americans. Another part went to the Midwest and South of the USA. Characteristically most of them returned to Germany at the end of WW II.

Second, most of the Austrian émigrés went abroad without being disciples of a particular school of thought, a pattern that is even valid for the younger economists from the Business Cycle Research Institute in Vienna. For example, in the early 1930s, an officer from the Rockefeller Foundation, very familiar with the habits and obsessions of the older Viennese economists, noted that young Haberler lost some of the narrow-mindedness of his fellow "Austrian Economists" during his fellowship term. The same could have been said about Morgenstern and Machlup soon after their arrival on the other side of the Atlantic. If one had to look for inveterate narrow-minded Austrians I would name Ludwig Mises and Eric Voegelin, both of whom hardly changed after their departure from Vienna (it would be easy to name more than half a dozen Germans with a similar mindset). Yet most of the Austrians adapted quickly to the new intellectual environment. As a by-product of this lack of apprenticeship and school thinking you couldn't find any Austrian rooted school of social thought. Probably the influence of Schutz on phenomenological sociology and ethnomethodology is an exception.

¹⁴ Tillich career in the US was partly subsidized from the Special Research Aid for Deposited Scholars established by the RF (Thomas B. Appleget, *The Foundation's Experience with Refugee Scholars* [1946], RF, RG 1.2, Series 200, Ref-3, RAC).

Third, the Austrians produced no public intellectuals like Hannah Arendt, and later on Herbert Marcuse, nor prolific scholars who addressed themselves to a wider audience or who were recognized by lay people. That is surprising because the Austrian style of thinking, if there was one, would have fit the world of pragmatism better than Heideggerians like Arendt, Hegelians like Marcuse, or a conservative like Leo Strauss. The tradition of extramural educational activities by Austrian academics did not find a follow-up in exile. Insofar as Austrians impressed people they did this by using what Americans call in their vernacular "Viennese charm", or *Schmäh*, an untranslatable Austrian expression, which is definitely more pejorative. It means to make sophisticated jokes, impress others especially by using paradoxical expressions, to draw the attention of one's audience to the most surprising results and so on. I am inclined to think that Peter Drucker's success in management studies, Ernest Dichter's influence in the world of advertising, Bruno Bettelheim's influence on practical education, and Paul Lazarsfeld's acceptance as an authority in different fields resulted at least partly from this very Austrian style of making an argument.

Fourth, former Austrians distanced themselves from their past faster than any other group of refugees. Practically no scholar joined any of the tiny political groups fighting each in exile, nor were the vast majority of former Austrians engaged in re-establishing contacts with their country of origin at the end of the war. One of the exceptions is Paul Lazarsfeld who went to Vienna in the late 1950s to investigate the intellectual climate there as a consultant for the Ford Foundation. To my knowledge he was the only former target of racial persecution who took the initiative to re-establish contacts. As an observer familiar with Austria's intellectual life in the inter-war period he described the difference he noticed when he first returned to his hometown in 1959 in an epigrammatic phrase: "No brains, no initiative, no collaboration".¹⁵ In spite of his opinion about the Austrians he helped create the Institute for Advanced Studies in Vienna.

Fifth, few former Austrians could not assimilate to their new environment; a sad story could be told about Edgar Zilsel, his errors and the difficulties he experienced. Yet on the other hand, the number of Austrians obtaining levels of academic achievement in the US was

¹⁵ Letter from Paul F. Lazarsfeld to Shepard Stone, Ford Foundation, June 29, 1959 (Paul F. Lazarsfeld Papers, Box 32: Austria, Columbia University, Rare Book and Manuscript Library).

higher than positions were available in Austria during the first two thirds of this century. One example I discovered recently at the Rockefeller Archive illustrates this. The psychologist Gustav Ichheiser came to this country relatively late. He found in Louis Wirth at Chicago a mentor and worked for a while in one of Wirth's race relations' research projects. Although Gordon Allport tried to help him get a job at Clarke University he was turned down because of his "race".¹⁶ Later he taught for a short period at a southern black college. In 1951 he was put into psychiatric clinic against his will, since he was diagnosed as being of the "schizophrenia, paranoid type".¹⁷ He spent more than one decade in this institution. Due to a reform of the state's department of mental health he was later transferred to a program of family care, a sort of conditional discharge. With the help of the German-born political scientist Hans J. Morgenthau he published a small article "Is Nationalism Really Outmoded?"¹⁸ and sent offprints of it to at least two officers of the Rockefeller Foundation. I do not know why. The RF officers – one a Chicago graduate – read the article and found it "very thoughtful and thought provoking". But no one knew the author. Nevertheless Ichheiser received a friendly letter and an offer:

We are therefore prompted to send you the enclosed brief descriptive statement of the Foundation's International Relations Program. If per chance you have a research and writing project which could suitably be considered under this program, we would be happy to hear from you.¹⁹

Finally Ichheiser got the grant, was released from psychiatric observation and worked until his death some years later as a research affiliate at Morgenthau's research center for international relations.

¹⁶ Letter from Wallace W. Atwood, President of Clark University, to Gordon W. Allport, June 29, 1943 and Allport's answer from June 30, 1943. Since Atwood raised the question whether Ichheiser is a Jew the reason why he did not get this job seems to be obvious (Gordon W. Allport Papers, Harvard University Archives, HUG 4118.1, Correspondence, Box 5).

¹⁷ A comparable story could be told about the economist John F. Nash Jr., who went through similar psychiatric treatment but finally became Nobel laureate in economic science in 1994. See for an autobiographical report on his career and psychiatric illness, Letter, December 29, 1999.

¹⁸ This particular piece (Ichheiser 1964) is not reprinted in Ichheiser, 1970, where much of his articles from his later years are collected.

¹⁹ Letter from Gerald Freund to Gustav Ichheiser, September 6, 1964 (RF, RG 1.2, series 200S, Box 571, Folder 4893, RAC).

Rockefeller Fellows and Hitler Refugees

To round off the portrait of the German-speaking social scientists among the Rockefeller Fellows I will examine another pattern. Normally fellowship holders live abroad only for a while. The two published Fellowship Directories provide information about the place of residence of nearly every former fellow for the years 1950 and 1970, respectively, long after the fellowships were consummated and after the defeat of the Nazi-system. A comparison between countries, where no political forced migration took place, and the two German-speaking countries under Nazi rule could show the "normal" brain drain and the effect of the Nazi persecution respectively. From all pre-WW II fellows only one third of the Swiss social scientists had settled in the USA by 1970, while two third of the Austrians had. The Germans show a migration pattern similar to the Swiss: only 36% lived outside Germany in 1970 (see table 7).

Table 7: RF Fellows from period 1 (before 1941), country of residence 1970 (row percentages)

Country of residence before fellowship	Country of residence 1970						Total
	Austria	Switzerland	USA	Other European countries	Rest of the world		
Germany	63	–	–	20	9	7	N = 54
Austria	–	24	–	68	4	4	N = 25
Switzerland	–	–	67	33	–	–	N = 6
Others	–	6	6	65	18	6	N = 17
Total	N = 34	N = 7	N = 5	N = 41	N = 9	N = 6	N = 102
Column %	(33%)	(7%)	(5%)	(40%)	(9%)	(6%)	(100%)

To assess the "normal" rate of brain-drain more precisely one could turn to data from the period after WW II, when none of the countries showed any sign of political persecution or any other political factor forcing scholars out of their native country: again, one third of the Swiss scholars lived abroad some years after the end of their fellowship, while Germans and Austrians became more committed to their homeland. 85% of the Germans lived anywhere in Germany and 82% of the Austrians had returned to their home base (see table 8).

**Table 8: RF Fellows from period 2 (after 1947),
country of residence 1970 (row percentages)**

Country of residence before fellowship	Country of residence 1970						Total
	Germany	Austria	Switzerland	USA	Other European countries	Rest of the world	
Germany	86			9		6	N = 35
Austria		82		9		9	N = 11
Switzerland	22		67			11	N = 9
Others	17			17	33	33	N = 6
Total	N = 33	N = 9	N = 6	N = 5	N = 2	N = 6	N = 61
Column %	(54%)	(15%)	(10%)	(8%)	(3%)	(10%)	(100%)

Additional support for estimating the amount of brain drain comes from a comparison of the migration pattern of the earliest cohorts of Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial fellows. Between 1924 and 1929 some hundred social scientists were selected by the national representatives of the Memorial to spend at least one year studying abroad, which at this time meant nearly solely to study in the States. Then neither the representative nor the fellows to-be would take any initial steps to avoid later victimization. In addition the nomination and selection processes were not affected by the devastating consequences of the Great Depression too. In comparing the countries of residence at the time immediately before the fellowship began and the addresses given around 1950 one finds very different rates (see table 9). The over-all rate of remaining in the country of origin indicates that every third fellow preferred to live where he lived before. (No data are available about the years between the granting of the fellowship and the report of the actual address around 1950 but the number of former fellows with an unknown address after WW II is as low as the one of the deceased persons – seven, respectively.) Most strikingly, no clear pattern emerges with regard to the different political developments. Italy with its fascist dictatorship and a comparably short period of German occupation had a higher rate of return than France which did not differ significantly from the United Kingdom. The Austrian case is again the most deviant one. Only one out of four former Austrian lived there in

1950. Most, but not all of the émigrés, would have fallen under the Nazi Nürnberg Laws and their definition who is a Jew.²⁰

**Table 9: Percentage of former LSRM fellows living
in their country of origin, again in 1950**

Selected Countries	Rate of "remainers" to the country of origin
Austria	25
Germany	55
France	68
United Kingdom	70
Italy	75
Sweden, Norway and Denmark	82
Average for all 23 countries	73

A more detailed analysis would provide additional clues that primarily younger not so established scholars took up the chances the opportunity structure offered them. Using a multi-variable tabulation of the sample of all German-speaking fellows over the whole period from the midst of the 1920s to the end of the 1960s one could see that people with a higher status in the formal structure of the University system more often returned to their country of origin than lower-ranking scientists, but the number of cases is too small to allow a broad interpretation. All in all, the German scholars who got a RF fellowship behaved similarly to scholars from a country like Switzerland where no political oppression took place, while the majority of the Austrian scholars around the Nazi-period reacted more like political refugees, clutching at any straw to survive.

RF subsidized scholars during the Nazi-period not only in providing funds to different refugee committees, especially the Emergency Committee in Aid of Displaced Foreign Scholars (see Duggan & Drury

²⁰ 60% of 178 LSRM fellows were Protestants, 22% Roman Catholic, but only 5% Jews; 16 Fellows did not report and one called himself "agnostic (Jew)". The highest number of Jewish Fellows in the broadest meaning of this term is about twenty people or one fifth, which is comparable to the numbers of Jewish University graduates and students of the inter-war period a sharp underrepresentation. Report of the European Fellowship Program in the Social Sciences of the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial 1923-1928, p. 23 (RF, RG 1.2, Box 50, Folder 380, RAC).

1948) and by establishing its own refugee aid funds but unintentionally and contrary to the rules of the fellowship program in that it offered chances to visit universities abroad before the Nazis seized power. A remarkable part of these visiting scholars "returned" to their host country only a few years later as refugees, but as refugees with a familiarity with the new country of residence and bonds to their peers there. Therefore only a minority of the former RF Fellows relied on the help provided for displaced scholars when they entered the United States again. Only five former RF Fellows from German-speaking countries received support from the Emergency Committee.²¹ Fifteen other former German-speaking fellows received direct support from the special funds Rockefeller Foundation created for the help of Nazi refugees. From these programs additional seventy-seven recipients came from the German-speaking countries.

Most of the former fellowship holders made their way without financial support from funds established to help refugees. Just to mention a few, Egon Brunswik, Gottfried Haberler, Fritz Machlup, Paul Lazarsfeld, and Gerhard Tintner. All these men were able to enter one of the universities within a reasonably short period after their immigration and some of them already had a job offer when they arrived in New York. Again, it may be noted that all these scholars were graduates from the University of Vienna. As an unforeseen but highly welcome side effect of their success they made room for some of the other refugees who did not have the fortune to visit their final destination before emigrating.

Conclusion

Normally evaluation studies on funding contrast means with ends, compare the intentions of donors with the accomplishments of recipients with a particular sum of money. The case study of the German-speaking RF fellows demonstrates that side effects, unintended and unforeseeable consequences were much more significant than ordinary achievement of pre-fixed goals. Just to mention the crucial ones: instead of strengthening the scientific community and thereby the econ-

²¹ 19 more former RF Fellows applied for funding but were rejected. The total number of German-speaking applicants amounts to an additional thirty-seven receivers of grants and sixty-two rejected applicants. Calculation on the basis of Duggan & Drury, *Rescue of science and learning and unpublished statistics from the papers of the Emergency Committee In Aid of Displaced Foreign Scholars*, Rare Book and Manuscript Division, The New York Public Library.

omy of the recipient countries, as was intended by the board of trustees of RF, its fellowship program encouraged young graduates to spend some more years searching for a place in the world of science, crowding the still congested academic labor market. As a consequence countries like Austria, then notoriously known for over-producing and under-employing creative talents, experienced a multiplication of job seekers. It came as no surprise that some of these well-educated and cosmopolitan young men extended their job search beyond the borders of their country of origin; and it is no surprise too that they found more opportunities in the emerging new center of the world's economy and sciences, the United States, than in Europe, shaken by economic depression and political turmoil.

Most of the studies on migrating scholars during the 1930s correctly assess the cause for migration but are less unanimous in their evaluation of the racist and political ideology of the Nazi movement which became law after the Nazi party seized power in Germany 1933, and following the expansion of the Third Reich to Austria and parts of Czechoslovakia in 1938. Focusing on a specific group, the social scientists, reveals only a *slightly different picture with regard to the main proportions but more depth of focus in it*. The number of pre-WW II RF fellows from Austria leaving their country was disproportionate to any other European country, but due to their prior stays they adapted themselves much easier than first time immigrants to the not completely new environment.

As soon as one had settled into the new country, one was able to offer support for new immigrants and affidavits for friends and relatives still remaining in Europe. As an unintended consequence the success of the one group opened up opportunities of support for not so well-known and well-adjusted ordinary refugees in the way chain migration usually operates. But both groups, the well accommodated and easily assimilated immigrants and the much larger group of ordinary refugees, had to live with the awareness that the Nazis would have forced them out of their home country or have murdered them. This legacy overshadowed the success story permanently.

Looking at the story from the perspective of the donor a comparable ambiguity arises. The cosmopolitan nature of the Rockefeller Foundation reflected in the distribution of fellowships to foreigners resulted in a reinforcement of the US sciences and the definite relocation of the center of the scientific world to the new one. Instead of promoting the "well-being of mankind" this part of RF activities resulted in a betterment of American academia, instead of a dis-

semination of "realistic", "inductive" social science research in other countries than the USA at least it resulted in a strengthening of this particular type of research in America in the middle term. After WW II it meant an intensified and still prevailing defense of a genuine German type of social research. As a consequence, the false identification of styles of doing research with national particularities was perpetuated.

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